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The Puzzles of Patriotic Communism: 
Gennadi Zyuganov, the Russian Milosevic? 
By Alexander Yanov 
 
Recently, the editors of The Economist posed a question which is asked now 
with increasing frequency in anticipation of Russia's crucial presidential elections. 
Will the Yel'tsin reforms "be reversed or merely muddled and slowed?" (1) Their 
reasoning is pragmatic and seems persuasive. Economic changes in Russia, 
they conclude, are "fundamentally irreversible" because "powerful economic 
interests are unwilling to lose their current advantage to raging inflation and price 
control...." No wonder they sound optimistic: "If Russia's key reforms are merely 
slowed and tinkered with, rather than reversed, the country could still hope for a 
reasonably stable, outward looking market economy, rather like Poland's." The 
Economist , therefore, counsels that "the only policy [for the West] is patience." 
(2) 
 
The fatal flaw in this analysis is that the alternatives which constitute its 
foundation by no means exhaust Russia's options. In fact, the major alternatives 
dividing the ideologues of Moscow's opposition (which calls itself "irreconcilable") 
have less in common with Poland's than with those faced by Franjo Tudjman in 
Zagreb and Slobodan Milosevic in Belgrade when the Serbian mini-empire 
known as Yugoslavia crumbled. They choose not between market and non-
market economies, but between ethnic and imperial nationalism. Both Vladimir 
Zhirinovsky's triumph in 1993 and the "patriotic" communists' victory in 1995 
indicate that the Milosevic alternative, i.e., imperial nationalism, is winning. 
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Further, the many Western observers who subscribe to the thinking which 
dictates The Economist's conclusion miss the political dimensionof Russia's 
upheaval: The battered post-August 1991 regime, the disheveled but still pro-
Western proto-democracy, is nearing the end of its rope. 
 
To be sure, the future does not look threatening if we agree with some analysts 
that Russia is "irrelevant" or if all we want from Russia is that it join the club of 
market economies rather than the community of democratic nations. But 
shouldn't we keep in mind that both pre-war Japan and Weimar Germany had 
market economies which proved insufficient to prevent Pearl Harbor and the 
Holocaust? 
 
If we follow The Economist's recommendations, the chances that Russia would 
proceed along the "Polish path" are, in fact, negligible whether or not its masters 
muddle through with economic reform. After all, Russia is not Poland. For many 
decades, it has been a powerful contender for world domination, a superpower, 
the center of an enormous empire of which Poland itself was just a minuscule 
and distant periphery. 
 
"Patience" can hardly help us fight the imperial mentality of Russia's 
irreconcilable opposition. Before we start asking "who lost Russia?," we should 
take a closer look at one of the factions of the opposition, the "patriotic" 
communists, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) led by 
Gennadi Zyuganov, Yel'tsin's most formidable rival for the presidency. 
 
Certainly, the return of communists to power is no longer big news in the former 
Soviet empire. Even so, the Zyuganov phenomenon seems different for at least 
three reasons. The first is obvious: It represents the "Reds'" attempt to dominate 
not just the periphery of the former empire but the imperial center itself (which 
happens to be a nuclear superpower). Second, unlike, say, Aleksander 
Kwasniewski in Poland, Zyuganov is not just a former communist; his party is not 
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even trying to hide its true "patriotic" colors, nor is it claiming that it has reformed 
itself. Third, unlike all other returning communists, Zyuganov's party belongs not 
to the liberal pro-Western wing of its alma mater but to its nationalist, openly anti-
Western extreme. 
 
The End of the United Right Front 
We can identify the point when the idea of the communists coming back to power 
started to trouble the minds of the Moscow public: The "Reds" spent all of 1992 
in the ranks of the "patriotic" opposition fighting the post-August 1991 regime 
alongside the nationalist "Whites" and the fascist "Browns." (3) The communists 
started to desert the "patriotic" fraternity only after the unexpected defeat of this 
opposition in the April 1993 referendum. 
 
A string of victories in local elections during the Summer of that year, and the 
formation of the so-called "red belt" to the South and West of Moscow, must have 
convinced them for the first time that going it alone had its benefits. Still, it was 
the rout of the "patriotic" armed rebellion in October 1993 that caused the 
communists finally to cut the umbilical cord tying them to the original "Red-White" 
womb. The guns of October must have sounded to them like the funeral knell of 
the joint "patriotic" enterprise. 
 
It was at this point that Zyuganov and Aleksandr Sterligov, the two "patriotic" 
leaders whom the collapse of the empire and the Party had suddenly made stars 
of the first magnitude, split irrevocably. It did not, however, happen overnight. In 
February 1992 Zyuganov, then just one of many retired Party bureaucrats, 
considered himself lucky to be invited by Sterligov, the former KGB general, to 
serve as co-chair of his ultra-"patriotic" Russian National Assembly-Sobor (RNS) 
which claimed "a major national achievement: the strategic union of the Reds 
and the Whites." (4) Moreover, while their honeymoon lasted, Zyuganov fully 
shared Sterligov's vision of this alleged "national achievement." As he wrote at 
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the time, "Our united opposition is the only way for both the Reds and the Whites 
to prevent a final Russian tragedy fraught with a universal apocalypse." (5) 
 
By the Fall of 1992, however, Sterligov's dictatorial ambitions had visibly 
alienated Zyuganov although even then he did not break with the "patriots." 
Instead, he simply crossed the street, as it were, to join the competing "patriotic" 
crowd of the National Salvation Front (FNS). It took the October debacle of the 
following year to force him to abandon the idea of a united Right front. Coinciding 
as it did with Vladimir Zhirinovsky's triumph in the parliamentary elections (which 
scared the moderate electorate out of its wits), Zyuganov's split with the "patriots" 
has, for the first time, put the communists back into the forefront of Russian 
politics--as a seemingly moderate alternative to the wounded post-August 1991 
regime. 
 
Why should the most distinguished leader of the Russian Left stubbornly cling to 
the Right fraternity for so long? We will come to that later. For now let's only note 
that his move to the Left proved immensely beneficial for Zyuganov while 
Sterligov's "patriotic" star continued to decline. By the time of the Third Congress 
of Zyuganov's communists in January 1995, many Moscow liberals were more 
afraid of him than of Sterligov and Zhirinovsky taken together. 
 
"Is fascism the No. 1 enemy today?" asked the liberal Kuranty in January 1995. 
The answer was, of course, no. "Fascism is a ghost that might or might not 
materialize while the communists are really on the offensive." Two months later, 
Vladlen Liulechnik, a Russian analyst, confirmed the verdict: "A communist 
victory not just in the parliamentary, but in the presidential elections as well, is no 
longer a utopia, it's real." (6) To put it differently, if two winters ago Sterligov and 
Zyuganov were perceived in Russia as ideological twins, nowadays analysts tend 
to consider them polar opposites. However, is it correct to assume that by 
quitting as comrades-in-arms they also cease to be comrades-in-thought? 
Unfortunately, this crucial question has never been asked in Moscow. 
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Two Points of View 
As might have been expected, the prospect of communist restoration has divided 
Russia. Yet, the lines of the divide are exceedingly peculiar. The politicians who 
rode the crest of the 1989-1991 anti-communist wave are shouting bloody 
murder. Yegor Gaidar acknowledges in Izvestia that Russian capitalism has 
come out "disgusting and terrifying, light-fingered and socially unjust." Still, the 
return of the communists would, in his view, makes things immeasurably worse. 
"As can be assumed, coming back to power, they would start to nationalize 
property acquired, from their standpoint, illegally.... Violent redistribution of 
property is always a revolution. A revolution is always blood." (7) 
 
On the other hand, many voters are so tired of the antics of the "light-fingered" 
capitalists that they may well be ready to repent their 1989-1991 anti-communist 
"wildness." Moreover, a good part of the intelligentsia tries to justify this new tide 
of anti-anti-communism by looking at their neighbors. Nothing terrible happened, 
they proclaim, either in Lithuania or in Poland where reformed communists 
returned to the helm--no redistribution of property, no blood, no revolution. The 
chaos and disorder still plaguing Russia seems to have ebbed there. So, why not 
try it in Moscow as well? 
 
This mood is becoming so pervasive that even the skeptical Izvestia intones, 
"Zyuganov's communists are drifting irretrievably toward a peculiar kind of social 
democracy, albeit of an imperial orientation." (8) The response of Yelena Bonner, 
Andrei Sakharov's widow and herself an old hand in Russian politics, to the 
question of an alternative to Yel'tsin is even more stunning: "Sure there is an 
alternative," she said, "From my point of view, it is Zyuganov." (9) Of course, she 




All this may look less startling if we take into account the virtuosity of Zyuganov's 
handlers. They work hard, attempting to bury not just their client's recent 
connection to "patriots" like Sterligov, but his own "patriotic" past. They sell him 
as a devout parliamentarian and a responsible statesman, a bit on the Left, to be 
sure, but still respectably within the mainstream of the post-August 1991 reality. 
 
Naturally their spin is enhanced by the mockery of bewildered liberal papers 
like Moskovskii Komsomolets which poked fun at Zyuganov's "deviations from 
Leninist orthodoxy." The furious anti-Zyuganov rhetoric of communist diehards 
also contributes to his moderate image. More surprisingly, Western policy 
makers seem to have embraced the spin as well. A meeting that took place on 
May 9, 1995 constitutes a powerful example: During his visit to Moscow, 
President Bill Clinton invited Zyuganov for a chat--along with Russian reformers. 
To be sure, no "patriots" were present--neither Zhirinovsky nor Sterligov, not 
even Yuri Skokov or Aleksandr Lebed'. 
 
The bait intended originally for internal consumption has been swallowed, one 
may say, globally. Zyuganov's image makers succeeded in selling their client as 
a moderate. His "patriotic" past seems to be buried safely, anointed with an aura 
of political respectability by no less a principal in international affairs than the US 
president. 
 
Of course, what was buried can be exhumed. There is such a thing as history 
that specializes in unraveling "spin" no matter how popular it might be or by 
whose authority it is blessed. It seems that a touch of history is in order here. 
Without it, there would be little use in asserting in Moscow (or in Washington for 
that matter) that Zyuganov, his communist credentials notwithstanding, never 
had anything to do with Leninist orthodoxy. Or that he is much closer in his views 
to Sterligov or, for that matter, to Slobodan Milosevic than, say, to Leonid 
Brezhnev, let alone Karl Marx. 
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Zyuganov's party's article of faith, its motto, reads: "Russia, Labor, Power to the 
People, Socialism!" In open defiance of internationalist Leninist orthodoxy, 
Russia occupies the place of honor, while socialism obviously, one may say 
demonstratively, takes a back seat. Yet, it is only on this, the last of the four 
points of the new communist party's slogan, that Sterligov or Milosevic will 
disagree with Zyuganov. On all the others they are in full agreement. 
 
The Limits of Political Metamorphoses 
Naturally, the image makers will tell you that history has nothing to do with their 
client's current convictions. People change. In revolutionary times, they often 
change beyond recognition. Today nobody in Moscow, where political 
metamorphoses are the rule rather than an exception, would dare to question 
that. Take the same Mikhail Gorbachev or Aleksandr Yakovlev or Nikolai 
Ryzhkov, all of them former members of the ruling Politburo. Take Viktor 
Chernomyrdin or Arkady Volsky, former members of the Central Committee. I 
won't even start on Yel'tsin. None of these gentlemen is even a communist 
anymore. So why couldn't Zyuganov change as well? 
 
There are, however, limits to such change. Someone for whom, say, slavery had 
always been a part of the natural order would find it daunting to become an 
abolitionist. Nor can a man for whom democracy is sacred turn into a dictator. It's 
for this simple reason that Jefferson Davis could not under any circumstances, 
however revolutionary, turn into an Abraham Lincoln or Aleksandr Kerensky into 
a Lenin. For that matter, even within one and the same party, a Bob Dole will 
never transform himself into a Patrick Buchanan. To envision the magnitude of 
change that a politician can possibly undergo, we must first take these limits into 
account. 
 
I have some experience with this exercise. Mikhail Gorbachev has been in my 
field of interest since 1976. Then a regional Party secretary, he boldly went 
against the current by introducing radical agricultural reform at a time when 
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similar attempts had been crushed elsewhere. When he was made a member of 
the Politburo in 1980, I concluded one of my books by asking if it was possible 
that this fellow was destined to be the new Russian Reformer? (10) 
 
In the Summer of 1990, I was asked by the Moscow daily Sobesednik whether 
president Gorbachev could, for the sake of saving a great empire, become a 
dictator. My answer was "no way." (11) I refer to these guesses, which happened 
to be right on the money, not to boast of some special gift for prognostication but 
to demonstrate how certain we can be that even the most dramatic changes in 
political careers are circumscribed by the past. It is to clarify the limits of 
Zyuganov's possible change that we now turn to the years of imperial twilight, 
when his convictions were molded--if only to provide some historical perspective 
to what might otherwise seem a merely psychological analysis. 
 
Under the Same Roof 
The now deceased Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) had called 
itself proudly an organization of co-thinkers. By now it is common knowledge that 
at least since Stalin's death in 1953 it was anything but that. In reality, it was 
comprised of a number of proto-parties based not merely on different but 
antagonistic political orientations and historical traditions. 
 
There was among them, for example, the party of socialism with a human face, 
the alma mater of both Gorbachev and Yakovlev. Socialism's roots extended not 
only to the 1956 de-Stalinization and the Prague Spring but much deeper in the 
Russian political psyche--descending, in fact, to the very dawn of the Muscovite 
statehood, the times of reform and liberalization under Ivan III. Belonging to the 
party of socialism did not mean, of course, that its members would not change. 
However, the range, the paradigm of the change, was circumscribed by their 
past. Gorbachev found himself eventually a social-democrat of the old Marxist 
mold; while Yakovlev's transformation went much deeper, he emerged a modern, 
i.e., a non-Marxist social-democrat. 
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Chernomyrdin and Ryzhkov graduated from the technocratic party of the CPSU. 
They also wanted to reform the decaying empire. What troubled them, however, 
was not so much the absence of freedom as the country's constantly growing 
backwardness. For this reason, the technocrats preferred a perestroika based 
not so much on liberalizing the system as on borrowing from the West the fruits 
of its microchip revolution. The spirit of this party first manifested itself during the 
reign of Peter I. Among the technocrats there is also a range of political 
metamorphoses; from Chernomyrdin who fully accepted the post-August 1991 
reality to Ryzhkov who is ready even for an alliance with the "patriots" to turn 
perestroika back to its pre-August technological beginnings. 
 
Naturally, both of these parties were working for reform. The perestroika each 
envisaged was pro-Western, oriented toward Russia entering the global market. 
To their misfortune, both confronted the dominant and thoroughly corrupted 
Brezhnevist "Marsh" (12) whose power base lay outside Moscow. Power resided 
with the regional bosses, the real overlords of the land, who were concerned not 
so much with the world market or the microchip revolution, as with the 
preservation of their own status and authority. 
 
The "Marsh" was the only one of the post-Stalin proto-parties whose perestroika 
had already been accomplished in 1964 when, under the guise of ousting the 
troublemaker Nikita Khrushchev, they outwitted the technocrats and seized 
controlling interest in the company called the Central Committee of the CPSU. 
The platform of their coup included a return to the Leninist principles of "party 
democracy," which seemed the only way to prevent the emergence of another 
murderous despot like Stalin while preserving the Party's political monopoly. 
Their "Leninism" was thus reduced to a single formula: The ultimate power in the 
Party must belong to its "parliament," i.e., the Central Committee. As long as 
regional bosses constituted the voting majority in that quasi-parliament, their 
dominance in the big Party was undisputed. 
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Although the "Marsh" was not above borrowing technology from abroad (that's 
the real reason they engineered a detente with the West), they nevertheless saw 
a threat in any radical reform, let alone a pro-Western one. They wanted instead 
to somehow adapt these permanently changing technologies to an ossified 
imperial body. That was why, in the last analysis, detente was dead on arrival: By 
the time they adapted to today's technologies they were yesterday's news. 
 
Like the pro-Western parties, the "Marsh" was deeply rooted in Russia's political 
tradition. One may say that the first Brezhnev in its history was Peter I's father, 
the tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich. They do not have a conservative political vision, 
they just stand pat. Of course their continuing dominance would have doomed 
Russia to permanent backwardness. 
 
Thus the split within the CPSU went exactly along the tectonic lines that divided 
Russian elites throughout the centuries. 
 
Still the inventory cannot be complete without mentioning the party which 
dominated Russia's political landscape so often, the party of imperial anti-
Westernism, the "patriotic" fundamentalists as it were (or, as some of them call 
themselves now, conservative revolutionaries). After Stalin's death they remained 
in a state of deep shock. The blow they suffered at Khrushchev's hands was so 
powerful that it took them over a decade to start planning a comeback. It was 
only by the end of the 1960s that they were able to present the world with an 
elaborate program of a conservative restoration (or "patriotic" perestroika, if you 
will). 
 
By then, however, the world did not feel like sorting out such nuances in Russian 
politics. In the midst of the cold war all communists looked the same color. It was 
only to those rare observers who had a vision of Russia beyond communism that 
these shades of red mattered. Those observers insisted that distinctions within 
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the CPSU were not only significant and may one day be of overwhelming 
importance, but also that the most essential of them was precisely the line 
distinguishing the "patriots" from all others. The historical tradition behind the 
"patriots" was more potent and by far more dangerous than the one behind the 
Kremlin policy makers of the time. 
 
According to this "patriotic" tradition, Russia is not just one of the great European 
nations but a separate civilization, the "Third Rome," the sole guardian of the 
true, unspoiled, orthodox faith in the world. The mission it inherited from its 
Eastern Roman ancestors is to stand up to Western heretics and impostors. Ivan 
the Terrible was the first tsar to attempt an implementation of this "Russian idea" 
in his imperial policy. Nicholas I with his "Official Nationality" and Stalin with his 
"Socialism in One Country" were the most distinguished modern exponents of 
this ancient myth. 
 
In other words, we were dealing here with the most irreconcilably anti-Western 
faction of all those within the CPSU. Given that by the 1970s Russia was a 
nuclear superpower, the potential damage that a "patriotic" perestroika in 
Moscow could have caused the world seemed immeasurably greater than 
anything of which the decrepit ruling "Marsh" was capable. For this was the party 
determined to turn Russia into a nation of West-haters. Zyuganov's and 
Sterligov's character and convictions were shaped in this "patriotic" milieu. 
 
What the "Patriots" Stand For 
Each of the proto-parties within the CPSU sought to identify the primary evil 
eating away at the foundations of the empire. For the technocrats, it was the 
empire's technological incapacity; for potential social-democrats, its inherent 
hostility to a human face. Even the "Marsh" had its favored evil--corruption. But 
when the "patriots" joined in the search for original sin they, as befits 
revolutionaries, however conservative, pointed to Leninist orthodoxy itself--the 
very core of the "Marsh's" power--or more precisely, to what they considered its 
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anti-Russian "internationalism" borrowed from the West and rooted in Marx's 
Jewish philosophy. 
 
From the "patriots'" perspective, the materialism and spiritual destitution of the 
Brezhnevist "Marsh" had indeed driven Russia into a dead end, but Leninist 
"internationalism" was killing the nation. It had forced the rulers to abandon the 
traditional Russia-first policy in favor of pursuing a phantom "internationalist" 
cause around the world. It imposed on Russia a false obligation to fight Western 
capitalism while completely overlooking the mortal danger of the 
"Americanization of the spirit." (13) This was the real evil invading the nation, the 
minds of its rulers included, turning it into a poor relation, not to say an 
unfortunate clone of the West, instead of standing up to it as an equal and 
determined rival. 
 
In fact, the historical predestination of Russia, the "patriots" believe, is to serve 
as a great spiritual alternative to this soulless cosmopolitan "Americanization." 
No wonder the latter dominates the world: The real alternative which could come 
only from Russia is missing. "We have to, we must!, create our own international 
community. We will unite in it with Asia which is inseparably linked to us both 
historically and geographically and with the countries of the Third World." Let 
Russia be Russia!--such was the motto proclaimed by the "patriots" in the late 
1960s. This motif still permeates the program of Zyuganov's communists. "We 
must live as one can live only in Russia, disregarding the utopian recipes [of 
Leninism] and foreign ways of life." (14) 
 
If the real disease ruining the empire is Leninist internationalism, the cure is 
obvious. It is a "patriotic" perestroika capable of freeing the country from the 




In other words, the real controversy in post-Soviet countries is not at all about 
communists coming back to power. It is about which communists are coming 
back to power. 
 
In Warsaw, for instance, these communists were the Polish counterparts of 
Gorbachev and Yakovlev, i.e., the former champions of socialism with a human 
face. In Belgrade, they were the graduates of the "patriotic" school, i.e., the 
Serbian counterparts of Zyuganov and Sterligov. Consequently, these 
differences between communist schools of thought yield highly dissimilar political 
outcomes. In one case we see the usual political squabbles characteristic of an 
emerging democracy, in the other, ethnic cleansing and war. 
 
In fact, there is very little in President Milosevic's "Greater Serbia" scenario which 
Zyuganov would dispute: the same renunciation of Leninist orthodoxy, sacrificed 
in favor of a similar "National Idea"; the same imperial dream as a result. To be 
sure, the Russian "patriotic" communists would add to this mix a good deal of 
ferocious anti-Westernism. After all, unlike their Serbian counterparts, they 
represent a superpower that for decades contended for world leadership with the 
West. But that's about all they would add. 
 
There can hardly be any doubt that what Mr. Milosevic managed to accomplish in 
Belgrade since 1987 was an authentic "patriotic" perestroika. It did not just 
materialize out of thin air; the idea of a conservative revolution must have been 
present in the Serbian "patriotic" milieu for years during the twilight of Tito's 
Yugoslavia, just as it was in Moscow during the twilight of the Brezhnevist 
empire. They are different only in that the Serbian "patriots" have succeeded in 
turning their imperial dream into political reality while their Russian brethren have 
not. 
 
It seems sufficiently clear that there were in the works in Moscow not one, liberal, 
perestroika, as we have grown accustomed to thinking, but two. In which case, 
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the presence of the second option, a "patriotic" revolution analogous to the 
Serbian, suggests that we were balancing at the edge of a precipice without ever 
suspecting it. 
 
The Strange Death of the Soviet Empire 
A book under this title was published in 1995 by David Price-Jones, a British 
journalist who was intrigued by the bloodless collapse of the Soviet empire. (16) 
Why indeed was it so different from the demise of the tsarist empire in 1917 
which was accompanied by a brutal civil war? The author interviewed a number 
of officials of the former Soviet Union but did not, it seems, come up with any 
definite answer. Small wonder; he did not even suspect the crucial split within the 
CPSU and thus made no distinction among its constituent parties. 
 
It seems as if most of his interlocutors belonged to the party of socialism with a 
human face. They were naturally leaning toward a correct, albeit trivial answer 
that there just were not many people in the country ready to die for the 
communist idea--so hopelessly and so irretrievably compromised in the eyes of 
the masses. The answer of the "patriotic" communists would have been very 
different. In the first place, they would point out that if communism had indeed 
been so hopelessly compromised, one would be hard pressed to explain why the 
same masses are returning to it once again only a few years later. And not just in 
Lithuania, Hungary or Poland, but in Russia as well. Most importantly, though, 
they would enlighten Mr. Price-Jones: What was really compromised was not 
communism but its anti-Russian internationalist incarnation. 
 
The true picture, according to them, would be that in 1917, patriotic Russia 
resisted a foreign internationalist creed being imposed on it, hence the civil war. 
In contrast, in 1991, the unanimous outburst of anti-communist passions was in 
reality a national rebellion against this alien creed, hence the bloodless collapse 
of Soviet communism. There is nothing strange about that; it died in Russia in 
1991 from the same Leninist evil it imposed on the nation in 1917, they claim. 
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Still, even if we accept this "patriotic" logic, it begs more questions than it 
answers. Where, for instance, were the "patriotic" communists at the time of this 
national rebellion? Why did they allow the liberals to turn a popular revolt against 
alien orthodoxy into an anti-communist storm that swept them away along with 
the Leninists? How is it possible that the "patriots" happened to be the victims of 
this allegedly "patriotic" uprising? 
 
In fact, new puzzles spring to mind the moment we accept their logic. On the 
other hand, we cannot simply dismiss it either. After all, it explains what the 
liberals cannot, namely, why so many Russians are turning to the "patriotic" 
communists so soon after an anti-communist storm of such magnitude. 
 
Political Leapfrog 
It seems appropriate to start with the first manifestation of the "patriotic" creed 
which appeared as early as April 1968 in a series of thundering essays in one of 
the most popular journals, Molodaya gvardia (The Young Guard) and openly 
challenged the entire political and ideological course of the Brezhnevist "Marsh." 
I lived in Moscow at the time and I can testify to the breathtaking effect of this 
"patriotic" outburst. Its most enigmatic aspect was the fact that the regime 
appeared so obviously unable to put an end to such an effrontery--for years. 
 
Twenty-seven months passed before the journalKommunist, the mouthpiece of 
the ruling Politburo, found the courage to stand up to "Young Guardism," as this 
phenomenon of openly anti-Leninist propaganda had been dubbed in a land 
where Leninism was the official ideology. (17) Yet, even the verdict of the 
seemingly omnipotent Kommunist did not put an end to the spread of "Young 
Guardism." Instead, it started a kind of a political leapfrog previously unheard of 
in Moscow. The "patriots" retreated for a while but only to go on the offensive 
again. Moreover, a number of other publications joined the fray on the side of the 
rebels. (18) The regime's puzzling indecision was all the more striking because at 
stake was its holy of holies--the political monopoly of the Politburo as well as its 
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sacred Leninism. Somebody was obviously tying its hands; but who could that 
somebody possibly have been? 
 
In defiance of all logic, the regime's indecision evaporated as soon as the liberal 
opponents of the "patriots" raised their voices in defense of Leninism. All such 
attempts were punished immediately and mercilessly. The first victims of this 
paradox were members of the editorial board of the journal Novyi mir, for years 
the flagship of the party of socialism with a human face. In April 1969, it 
published a lengthy piece against Young Guardism based on impregnably 
Leninist principles. (19) Before the end of the year, the editor-in-chief of Novyi 
mir was fired and the editorial board dismissed. 
 
An even more bizarre occurrence shocked the Moscow public 37 months later. 
The acting chief of propaganda of the Central Committee, Aleksandr N. 
Yakovlev, published an uncompromising diatribe in Literaturnaya gazeta against 
these "patriotic" antics. (20) Once again the anti-"patriotic" message was based 
on thoroughly Leninist principles and once again the messenger was punished. 
 
By no means should this be construed to indicate that the regime had grown soft. 
If it gave the establishment liberals short-shrift, its reprisals against the dissidents 
were as savage as ever--even though the only thing the dissidents demanded 
was for the regime to respect its own constitution, and all that the establishment 
liberals did was defend the regime's own ideology. 
 
I could have only guessed in the 1970s about the nature and logistics of these 
mysterious events. It so happened that those guesses were documented at the 
time. Here are the most important of them: 
 
• The leapfrog of 1968-1973 was a "declaration of war between canonical 
Marxism and the establishment Right [as I called the "patriotic" party 
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within the CPSU at the time]--a fight to the death whose finale is still far 
from clear." (21) 
 
• The focus of this war was the West with which the regime wanted detente 
and which the "patriots" hated. The rulers, they said, are "engaged in 
flirtation with America. They think that their ICBMs will defend them from 
the mortal threat radiating from that country. They will not for the real 
threat is not American missiles, but 'American spirit.'" In reality, "the 
Americanization of the spirit can be combated only by its Russification." 
(22) 
 
• The Young Guards' "struggle against liberal 'cosmopolitanism' was 
inherently related to its struggle against the official Brezhnevist 
'internationalism.'" (23) 
 
• "Young Guardism essentially proposed a replacement of the pseudo-
Soviet, in its view, Brezhnevist regime by a genuinely Russian one via a 
revolution from above," i.e., through what we would call now a perestroika. 
(24) 
 
• "Clearly, very powerful forces on high were concerned not to let the 
editorial board of Molodaya gvardia go under (the way the editorial board 
of Novyi mir did) and to assure that the establishment Right retained its 




The future did provide answers. If we read Sterligov's writings today or talk to 
Zyuganov, we'll see how distressingly accurate those guesses were. Yes, the 
"patriotic" party within the CPSU existed at least since the late 1960s and it 
indeed despised the ruling "Marsh." These days Zyuganov calls his former 
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bosses "Brezhnev and Co." (26) and describes them as "enfeebled." (27) 
Sterligov, the KGB general, even complains how unjustly the "patriots" were 
treated by those decrepit rulers. (28) What the Young Guards were spelling out a 
quarter-century ago is being fully confirmed today in the speeches of their former 
sponsors. Yes, they hated everything "Brezhnev and Co." stood for--their 
"flaccidity and torpor," (29) their materialistic "gastric pleasures," (30) and above 
all, their treasonous flirting with the West. 
 
We can still hear the Young Guards' fervor in Zyuganov's voice when he speaks 
of the West which cannot, in his view, live on the same planet with Russia, a 
"great and unified power, the pivot of geopolitical Eurasian expanse." (31) That's 
why "the struggle against Russia has become the priority of Western policy." (32) 
For this reason, as he assures his voters, the West set out "to destroy Russia's 
statehood and culture and to impose upon it a lifestyle alien to it." (33) 
 
Everything seems to fall in place, except for one thing. It is impossible to imagine 
that mid-level apparatchiki like Zyuganov or Sterligov, however influential they 
might have been, were able by themselves to shield the abusers of Leninism in 
an officially Leninist empire. Even in the highly improbable case that they were 
willing to risk their careers and, in fact, their entire livelihood, who would ever 
authorize them to make political decisions of such magnitude? Someone much 
more important was needed for this, someone "so powerful that even Brezhnev 
himself did not find it worthwhile to quarrel with him," as I wrote at the time. (34) 
In other words, the sponsors of the Young Guards needed a sponsor 
themselves. That supreme protector must have been in a position to punish all 
their opponents, even those as high-ranking as Aleksandr Yakovlev. 
 
But why would this mysterious protector of the "patriots" nurse such an anti-
Leninist crowd? What would he want to achieve by that? Supreme power? No 
doubt. It is easy to guess that he aimed at replacing Brezhnev. Still, this could not 
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have been the reason for nurturing a party of conservative revolutionaries 
irreconcilably hostile to the ruling regime and its ideology. 
 
What then? The only reason for such extraordinary behavior one can think of 
seems to be his extreme anxiety about the fate of the decaying empire. 
 
Certainly this was a man who was much better informed about the sorry state of 
his nation than his colleagues and was worried sick about its future. This must 
have been a first-rate strategist untouched by Brezhnevist corruption, a man who 
saw in the "patriotic" alternative to the exhausted Leninist orthodoxy the only way 
to revitalize the empire. In other words, we are talking about a Russian Milosevic. 
 
Yet, what do we know even today about this man who for a quarter-century held 
the keys to Russia's, if not the world's, future? If we still have no idea of who he 
might have been, then we are not beyond guesses. On the contrary, the time for 
guessing is upon us. 
 
The Main Question 
Who on the Soviet Olympus could have possibly been in a position to challenge 
Brezhnev? Judging from everything we now know of the balance of power in the 
fading Soviet empire, there seem to be only three figures of such caliber: Mikhail 
Suslov, Dmitry Ustinov and Yuri Andropov. 
 
The first, however, was a Marxist dogmatist, the ideologue of the "Marsh," and 
was apparently quite satisfied with being the regime's grey eminence. Ustinov, on 
the other hand, was a military technocrat without much political ambition and far 
from any ideological intricacies. To see him in the role of radical revisionist of 
Leninism is rather beyond the imagination. This leaves us with the man who 
indeed replaced Brezhnev after his death, the most mysterious of the Kremlin 
Olympians, a Soviet Talleyrand as it were, a man whose real intentions nobody 
knew. Even Gorbachev, apparently the closest to him, confesses now: "I can't 
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say that he was fully open with me or shared what was on his mind. Into some 
corners of his soul I wasn't allowed." (35) Could it be then that the mysterious 
sponsor of "patriotic" communism was Andropov? 
 
At first glance it does not fit the myths that abound about this man, and we have, 
in fact, nothing to rely on except myths. Moreover, the few known facts seem to 
contradict this suggestion. Andropov's assistants in the Central Committee were 
mainly technocrats like Arkady Volsky. He promoted Gorbachev who eventually 
became the demiurge of the liberal perestroika. He liked jazz and was 
uncharacteristically well-read. Finally, although Soviet dissidents saw him as a 
butcher, in the West Andropov enjoyed a rather liberal reputation. 
 
Of course, some wrote about him as a "gendarme in a dinner jacket, wearing 
white gloves, with a Jesuitic smile on his face." (36) And Eastern Europeans, 
especially the Hungarians and the Czechs whose yearning for socialism with a 
human face he personally crushed, still call him "a Gauleiter" and for them "terror 
is bound to his name forever." (37) Yet, to anyone in Russia who cares for the 
dear departed empire his name is still sacred. Being utterly contemptuous of the 
rest of "Brezhnev and Co.," both Zyuganov and Sterligov nevertheless adore 
Andropov. The latter even goes as far as to proclaim publicly that "under 
Andropov, we in the KGB were protecting the people." (38) 
 
For all this, however, nobody, as far as I know, has ever related Andropov either 
to the Young Guard attack on Leninism in the 1970s or even to the Zyuganov-
style "patriots." Nor has it been suggested that his unexpected death in the 
Orwellian year of 1984 saved the world from a "patriotic" perestroika in Russia 
and thus from another, still more perilous coil of superpower confrontation. 
 
It is sufficient, however, to analyze briefly the political alternatives Andropov 
encountered in May 1982 when he finally made it to the Kremlin to see that a 
nationalist perestroika must have appeared to him (and quite correctly at that) as 
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One way to give the empire a second wind was to do what the Czech reformers 
and later Gorbachev were trying to accomplish, i.e., to turn the machine around--
into socialism with a human face. Yet, even apart from the fact that this "human 
face" looked repulsive to Andropov (after all, he built his entire career on its 
suppression), it would have been simply counterproductive. The Hungarians in 
1956, the Czechs in 1968, and the Poles in 1980 proved beyond doubt that any 
liberalization of socialism threatened destruction of the empire rather than its 
revitalization. Moreover, Moscow's seal of approval on any such debauchery 
would lead only to a domino effect throughout the Soviet Union--from the Baltics 
to Ukraine. 
 
So liberalization was not an option. Like Winston Churchill, Andropov did not 
become the leader of the empire "to preside over its liquidation." Then maybe a 
swift technological breakthrough in the spirit of Peter I? This must have been a 
tempting dream, and Andropov perhaps did not part with it completely until the 
end of his days. That's why he kept promoting technocratic managers. Only 
unlike them, he was a pragmatist, not a dreamer. He could not help but see that 
their wish was doomed: The microchip revolution had left the empire too far 
behind the modern technological world to try to overtake it once again. 
 
There was, of course, always a possibility to borrow (or steal) advanced 
technology from the West. But the lamentable experience of Brezhnev's detente 
had already proved that it was a dead end. So the Petrine example was not a 
real option either. What was possible at the stagnant dawn of the 18th century, 
long before the industrial revolution, did not have a chance at the impetuous end 
of the 20th. 
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Apart from these theoretical considerations, Andropov's disillusionment with this 
option was clearly reflected in his foreign policy. He did not even try to win the 
trust of the Mecca on which the access to modern technology depended. The 
renewal of detente was out of the question, as was Soviet withdrawal from 
Afghanistan. On the contrary, he quite consistently antagonized the West. After 
all, it was during his brief reign that the Korean airliner was downed by Soviet 
fighters and SS-20s were deployed, putting Western Europe in the immediate 
range of a nuclear strike. It was then that President Ronald Reagan called the 
USSR "the evil empire." 
 
What options remained if one indeed wanted to stop the inexorable imperial 
decline? To be sure, any alternative required that the imperial machine be 
cleaned thoroughly of the Brezhnevist rust that had accumulated for decades. A 
purge of the "Marsh" was in order. A new generation of efficient and uncorrupted 
mechanics had to be promoted. New managers were to be installed at all the key 
sectors of administration--from machine-building (Nikolai Ryzhkov) to agriculture 
(Mikhail Gorbachev). One could not find such mechanics either among the 
"patriots" or among the liberals. The only available source of efficient 
management was the Soviet technocratic elite. These were precisely the men 
whom Andropov consistently promoted. Some of them (like Yegor Ligachev) 
were rather conservative, others (like Grigory Romanov) had close ties to the 
"patriots," still others (like Geidar Aliev) were ideologically neutral expert 
technocrats. None was a prodigy or of special intellectual brilliance. Gorbachev 
was a star expert on agriculture, not a closet liberal. Still, they were the best the 
Party could offer in their respective fields. 
 
The real trouble with the imperial machine, however, was not so much in the 
Brezhnevist rust Andropov's crew was supposed to clean, but rather that it ran 
out of gas. To get it moving again it needed more than just a few new mechanics, 
but ideological fuel which its empty Leninist tank no longer could provide. This 
resource had already been exhausted by Khrushchev in the 1960s. The only new 
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ideas able to inspire the Russians without destroying the empire were those of 
imperial nationalism (exactly the same as those which were used in the late 
l980s by Slobodan Milosevic). But these resources were in the hands of the 
"patriots." 
 
Their logic was simple and irresistible: A military empire cannot survive without 
an enemy--and a permanent confrontation. It just was not designed for peace. 
The sleepy Brezhnevist detente was killing it. Not only did the "patriots" have the 
right answer to imperial malaise: It was the only right answer. 
 
After all, the only surviving Nazi geopolitician, Jean Tiriar, was addressing 
Andropov in the early 1980s in his treatise The Euro-Soviet Empire from Dublin 
to Vladivostok, destined to become the geopolitical textbook of modern Russian 
"patriots." These were Tiriar's central theses: 
 
• "It is not war--it is peace that wears out the Soviet Union. In fact, it cannot 
exist under conditions of peace"; 
 
• "The Russian empire has inherited the determinism, the concerns, the 
risks and responsibility of the Third Reich, the destiny of Germany. From 
the geopolitical point of view, it is an heir to the Third Reich"; 
 
• Therefore, "there is nothing left for it but to achieve by moving from East to 
West what the Third Reich failed to accomplish by moving from West to 
East"; 
 
• "The masters of the Kremlin are faced with a historical choice. Geopolitics 
and geostrategy will force the USSR either to create a Soviet Europe or 
cease to exist as a great power." (39) 
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But if the "patriots" understood this, how could it be that Andropov, a natural born 
strategist, did not? And if he did understand it, then his choices were reduced to 
two: either to take the risk of a European war with a nationalist perestroika or to 
accept a slow, agonizing death for his beloved empire. Could there be any doubt 
as to what he had chosen? 
 
If this analysis is correct, the main puzzle of "patriotic" communism seems to be 
solved. The nationalist perestroika, victorious a few years later in Serbia, had 
been defeated in Russia because in February 1984 the Russian "patriots" lost 
their Milosevic. Devastated by this loss, incapacitated and demoralized, they 




As Alexander Herzen once put it, the place hypotheses occupy in history is 
miserable. Yet, he also rejected "the fatalism which sees in events their absolute 
inevitability; this is an abstract idea, a cloudy theory introduced from speculative 
philosophy into history and natural science. What has occurred, of course, had 
reason to occur, but this by no means signifies that all other combinations were 
impossible." (40) It is one of those possible "combinations" that concerns us 
here. 
 
This exercise in reconstruction is particularly enlightening and humbling when we 
consider the question of why this particular murderous "combination" of an 
ultranationalist perestroika failed to materialize. Was it because of the vigilance 
of Western politicians? Because of "star wars," as conventional wisdom tells us? 
Because of the doubling of our military budget (with the consequences of which 
we shall struggle well into the next millennium)? No, the "combination" in 
question did not come about in 1984 because of dumb luck. Every Russian who 
saw the situation from within would testify that at the time a "patriotic" perestroika 
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looked much more likely to occur than a liberal one, which struck literally out of 
the blue. Suffice it to mention the massive Jewish exodus. 
 
In fact, all the ingredients needed for a new confrontation with the West were in 
place. There was within the Central Committee and the KGB a strong "patriotic" 
party of which Zyuganov and Sterligov are living witnesses. There was the Young 
Guard ideological agenda for a nationalist perestroika (while there was none for a 
liberal version). Finally, there was a powerful leader capable of translating this 
agenda into action. These three essential ingredients made possible a "patriotic" 
perestroika in Serbia. Why would they not work in Russia? 
 
Obviously the ingredients found each other as early as the late 1960s. If we 
compare the dates, Andropov obtained the key position of the KGB Chairman in 
May 1967. The Young Guard's ideological onslaught on Leninism started less 
than a year later. 
 
What "combination" then awaited Russia--and the world--had Andropov not been 
struck down by a mortal disease less than a year after his coronation in the 
Kremlin? If fate, in other words, had granted him at least as many years as it 
granted Stalin, let alone Mao? 
 
It is only in the light of this somber hypothesis that we begin to comprehend 
Aleksandr Yakovlev's insight comparing Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika to 
Martin Luther's Reformation of the 16th century. As the latter made democracy 
possible, the former did not allow it to cease in midstream. "Without the 
Reformation in the Soviet Union," said Yakovlev in his open letter to me, 
"mankind was doomed either to a nuclear war or to a complete exhaustion of 
democratic resources and values.... It was this Reformation that saved the world 
for democracy." (41) Let us not forget then that it became possible only due to 
Andropov's sudden exit from the world scene. 
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A Historical Experiment 
While Mr. Yakovlev's paradigm manages to squeeze the entire history of 
democracy between the brackets of two great Reformations spread over four 
centuries, the more immediate result of the decade between 1985 and 1995 
might be understood better if considered as a kind of historical experiment. 
 
For generations, the states of the socialist universe lingered in their primitive 
orbits. In 1985 it was unclear how they could possibly get out of it, especially 
those with a deeply ingrained imperial mentality, the imperial nations as it were. 
For them, it inevitably would be a double gambit. For Russia, Serbia and China, 
the way to modernity, i.e., the surrender of total state control and a single-party 
monopoly, was bound to be accompanied not only with the invasion of unfamiliar 
private property, humiliating social inequality, inflation and government instability, 
but also with agonizing imperial nostalgia. 
 
To be sure, we still do not know all the answers to the problems related to this 
dangerous historical experiment. China has not even joined the fray yet and the 
future of Russia remains clouded. Still, by the end of its first decade the main 
contours of the scenarios seem sufficiently clear. To begin with, we now know 
that there are two principal ways by which imperial nations of the former socialist 
universe part with their past. 
 
Both can be called "perestroika." Still at the heart of the first of these ways, the 
liberal route, is the surrender of the military empire while the second, the 
"patriotic" road, is oriented toward its preservation (or regeneration). Although 
Russia, as it now appears, was within a hairbreadth of the latter, it has still 
chosen the former. Serbia followed the "patriotic" path. 
 
The sufferings brought by each of these transition are heartbreaking. But the first 
case involves mainly economic deprivation and social disruption, the explosion of 




Notably, China still has not made its choice between these two routes to 
modernity. While trying to insinuate itself into the mainstream of the microchip 
revolution, it still retains all the trappings of a medieval military empire: the single-
party monopoly and the preponderance of the military-industrial complex, total 
state control and a powerful "patriotic" faction oriented toward imperial 
preservation within the ruling party. In the twilight of Deng's reforms, China 
seems to be in search of its own Andropov. And the chances that it would prefer 
a "patriotic" way are as great as they were in Russia during the Brezhnevist 
twilight. 
 
In Russia the irreconcilable opposition does not yet believe that the liberal choice 
is final. It dreams of imperial revanche. It is split, as we know, and a number of 
contenders vie for the position of its Fuehrer. It is anybody's guess which of them 
is better equipped to fill the shoes of Andropov de nos jours. Still, at this point it 
seems to be the most experienced politician of them all, the leader of "patriotic" 
communists, Gennadi Zyuganov. 
 
After the debacle of 1984 he was naturally disillusioned and bitter. He even told 
me that at some point he was expelled from the Party, albeit temporarily. Yet, by 
the early 1990s he not only won the chairmanship of the reconstituted 
Communist Party, but became one of the strongest presidential contenders. 
Certainly, he owes part of his success to the traditional discipline of the 
communists and organizational skills acquired under the old regime. This is not 
to diminish his refined political instinct and the quality of his leadership in holding 
together the two main factions of his party: the "patriots" and the communist 
diehards. 
 
On the one hand, he managed to create an image of a party "drifting toward 
social democracy," the image embraced even by some of our Russian experts. 
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On the other hand, he attracts his old "patriotic" cohorts by thoroughly preserving 
the party's "imperial orientation." He assures the public that his party would act 
only in accord with the constitution and at the same time installs into the party 
program the militant clause about revolution as the locomotive of history (which 
negates any constitution whatsoever). 
 
Most interesting, however, as with Andropov, all this seemingly transparent 
maneuvering does no damage at all to his reputation. On the contrary, it seems 
to provide him additional credit, almost as though once again we are facing 
Andropov, reborn and fully adapted to the post-August 1991 reality. In other 
words, a Russian Milosevic. 
 
How Milosevic Did It 
If the scenarios outlined here are valid, the best way to predict what Zyuganov 
would do in case he succeeds in filling Andropov's shoes in Moscow is to look at 
how Milosevic used his presidential power in Belgrade. Would Zyuganov indeed 
nationalize what is already in private hands, as Yegor Gaidar fears? Milosevic did 
nothing of the sort. Instead he managed to nationalize the intellectual elite of his 
nation. With the aid of a thoroughly orchestrated and powerful propaganda effort, 
he resurrected its medieval fears of Catholic Croats and Muslim Bosnians, thus 
igniting imperial fever. And his timing was perfect. On the day of the 600th 
anniversary of the great Serbian defeat of 1389 he arrived on the historic Kosovo 
field where, in the presence of a million compatriots from all the corners of 
Yugoslavia, he vowed that one day they shall live in a Greater Serbia. And if the 
price for this is war--so be it. We Serbs shall overcome, he promised. 
 
He never sought a restoration of Leninism, his communist credentials 
notwithstanding; he wanted imperial revanche. Unfortunately, he succeeded; he 
won the psychological war for the soul of the Serbian intelligentsia and thus its 
unanimous support for a "patriotic" perestroika. This allowed him to send the 
Yugoslavian tanks against Vukovar, Dubrovnik and Sarajevo. 
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Is Anything Like That Possible in Russia? 
Judging from its history, it is. Moreover, in the last century and a half it has 
already happened twice. The first time during the triumph of Nicholas I's "Official 
Nationality" policy in the 1830s and then a century later in the midst of Stalin's 
dictatorship. In both cases, the Russian intelligentsia just as unanimously as the 
Serbian under Milosevic supported its ruler's confrontation with the West. Both 
times it faithfully followed the exhortations that Russia is not just one of the great 
European powers but a unique (in one case Orthodox, in the other socialist) 
civilization whose manifest destiny is to stand up to the West and to lead a 
general uprising of all anti-Western forces in the world. 
 
But then a strange thing occurred. In both cases, these conversions of the 
Russian intellectual elite joining forces with dictators appeared fleeting, transient, 
unreliable. In a few years it was deeply ashamed of this collaboration and 
returned to its traditional pro-Western ways. So strong was this repentance that 
in a matter of two decades after the first "patriotic" perestroika a de-
Nicholaization of the system was in full swing and a great liberal reform was 
underway. 
 
This experience was repeated a century later, when Khrushchev's de-
Stalinization of the 1950s made a mockery of the "patriotic" unanimity of two 
decades earlier. Once again it showed the world that there was nothing uniquely 
Russian under the mask of the allegedly glorious "unique civilization," just a trivial 
bloody dictatorship. What the mask was really designed to cover was an equally 
trivial imperial expansion. And in both cases within a few decades of this 
extensive metamorphoses the military empire itself had suddenly collapsed. Why 
this sequence? 
 
Any Russian "patriot" has a ready answer to this question. As Aleksandr 
Solzhenitsyn, who specializes in the first imperial collapse in 1917, explains in a 
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number of volumes, the "black whirlwind" of Western Marxism conquered Russia 
and ruined the nation due to the shameful pro-Western attitude of Russian 
intelligentsia. As to the second collapse in l991, there is Zyuganov telling us 
exactly the same tale. This time the "black whirlwind" is, according to him, 
embodied in "Western special services" with their "concept of destruction." (42) 
And who is to blame for the success of this villainy? Of course, the same pro-
Western intellectual elite and the Western "mercenaries" at the top headed by 
the "president-resident," as he dubbed Gorbachev. (43) 
 
If the diagnosis is the same in both cases--the perfidious West conspiring with 
the Russian intelligentsia against its own motherland--the treatment seems 
obvious. Only a fundamental reorientation of the intellectual elite, its irreversible 
"nationalization," can make Russia invulnerable now and for all time to any such 
Western "whirlwinds" and "concepts of destruction." 
 
In other words, to resurrect Russia means to make it a nation of West-haters. 
This is perhaps the most important conclusion that the "patriots"--from 
Solzhenitsyn to Zyuganov--have learned from the bitter experience of both great 
imperial collapses. 
 
The problem is only that this is easier said than done. If even powerful dictators 
proved unable to irretrievably "nationalize" the Russian intelligentsia, would a 
Zyuganov (let alone a Solzhenitsyn) be able to do it? 
 
The Time of Troubles 
Indeed, tectonic change seems to be underway in the Russian intellectual elite 
amidst the current collapse. At first glance, it may look rather paradoxical: It 
appears that the necessary precondition for its radical anti-Western reorientation, 
so much wanted by the "patriots," is exactly the liberal perestroika they loathe. 
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In both previous cases, the "patriotic" unanimity was imposed on the Russian 
intellectual elite by brutal dictatorships that practically cut off the nation from the 
world. The more harshly the rulers condemned the West, the more obstinately 
the intelligentsia romanticized the forbidden fruit. The liberal perestroika with its 
freedom of travel let the Russians take a closer look at their former idol in its 
dishabille as it were. In the first place, they feel betrayed by the West that has 
lost interest in Russia the moment it ceased to be a threat. After all, it was they 
who delivered the West from the trials of the cold war and the wastefulness of the 
arms race, and the threat of nuclear annihilation. A little more compassion to their 
own trials was, they believe, in order. Searching for the reasons for this betrayal, 
what do they see? Intellectual parochialism, lack of political imagination, a 
wasteland of commercialized mass culture and, most damagingly, the West's 
treatment of its own intelligentsia. They see it as stripped of intellectual 
leadership, confused and powerless to influence the course of history. 
 
This massive disillusionment with the former hero naturally translates into a 
contempt that even the most brutal dictators were unable to force down the throat 
of the Russian intelligentsia. It suddenly appeared to them that in at least one 
respect the "patriots" were right all along: Russian civilization, where the 
intellectual elite, however persecuted, remains the undisputed mentor of the 
nation, is indeed unique. 
 
No doubt, there is a long way from this new contempt to the hatred required for 
the "patriotic" perestroika. But the current time of troubles has been exceedingly 
cruel to the Russian intelligentsia. Not only did it find itself one of the first victims 
of the shock therapy, it also has to live through the crisis of all traditional values. 
Perhaps it has never been so perplexed, vulnerable and embarrassed, so unsure 
of itself and its liberal values. The inexperienced youth for whom not just Stalin 
but even Andropov is ancient history is especially vulnerable. 
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Add to this the 25 million countrymen, in many cases relatives, who became 
aliens overnight, who were perceived as defenseless and persecuted in their own 
former lands. And suddenly it appears that, if there is a close analogy to the 
present state of mind of the Russian intelligentsia, it is the state of mind of its 
Serbian counterpart--at the moment of Yugoslavia's collapse. All in all, if there 
has ever been a time to break its traditional allegiance to Western values, that 
time is now. 
 
There is no doubt that a Russian Milosevic, if he is indeed destined to come to 
the helm of the nation, will perform on the Russian intelligentsia the very same 
operation as his Serbian prototype. And who can guarantee that this time he will 
not succeed in making Russia a nation of West-haters? 
 
Imperial Passions 
The following quotations vividly describe the state of mind I mentioned: 
 
What is this so called Kazakhstan if not a legitimate territory of two former 
Cossack regions? Restore them, and there is no independent republic of 
Kazakhstan anymore. This is what our rulers would do immediately if they have 
indeed been guided by Russia's interest. (44) 
 
This is not even Zyuganov speaking. Nor is it Zhirinovsky. It is an intellectual, a 
writer, the most popular historical novelist in Russia for that matter. And it is only 
the beginning of what he has to say. "We must fight for Russia," Dmitry Balashov 
continues, “unless we fight we will be exterminated like roaches and rats.... I 
have six sons, four of them already of age when a man can take up arms. And 
although I am an old man, I can still hold a rifle as well. I vow on these pages: 
When it starts, I'll go to fight and my boys will go with me.... We will restore 
Russia, our Holy Rus'--yes, the same one, from the Baltics to the Black Sea, from 
Kuril islands to Carpathian Mountains. United and indivisible.” (45) 
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Of course, Balashov is far from a typical Russian intellectual. He has flirted with 
the idea of "Holy Rus"' for years. Still, it is one thing to toy with it in his writings 
and quite another to call millions of his readers to the barricades. Two million 
copies of Balashov's novels were sold in 1994. 
 
More importantly, though, it is impossible to find any difference between the 
imperial passions that overwhelm this Russian intellectual today and those that in 
the early 1990s led the Serbs to bombard Dubrovnik and Sarajevo. I heard 
exactly the same passionate speeches from respected intellectuals in Belgrade 
in 1990 and 1991. 
 
For six long years we proved powerless to stop first the fires of Serbian imperial 
nationalism stoked by Slobodan Milosevic and then the war and ethnic cleansing 
that resulted from it. And this was in tiny Yugoslavia, which does not possess 
even a single nuclear warhead. What position will we be in when it starts in 
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